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— Symposium —
The Supreme Court’s Treatment
of Same-Sex Marriage in United
States v. Windsor and
Hollingsworth v. Perry: Analysis
and Implications
INTRODUCTION

Jonathan L. Entin†
For many years, gay rights advocates focused primarily on
overturning sodomy laws. The Supreme Court initially took a
skeptical view of those efforts. In 1976, the Court summarily affirmed
a ruling that upheld Virginia’s sodomy law.1 And a decade later, in
Bowers v. Hardwick,2 the Court not only rejected a constitutional
challenge to Georgia’s sodomy law but ridiculed the claim.3 That
precedent lasted less than two decades before being overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas.4
Meanwhile, the effort to secure legal protection for gay rights
expanded to other issues. For example, in Romer v. Evans,5 the
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1.

Doe v. Commonwealth’s Att’y, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff’g mem. 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (3-judge court). Although this challenge
failed, it is worth noting that there was a dissenting opinion in the
district court, see 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting), and
three justices would have set the case for plenary consideration in the
Supreme Court, see 403 U.S. at 901 (Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ.,
“would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument”).

2.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).

3.

See id. at 194 (“[T]o claim that a right to engage in such conduct is
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”); id. at 196 (Burger,
C.J., concurring) (“Condemnation of [sodomy] is firmly rooted in
Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical standards.”).
The statute at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick later was invalidated for
violating the right to privacy protected under the state constitution.
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).

4.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

5.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Supreme Court struck down a state constitutional amendment that
repealed all existing laws and policies prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation because the amendment was based on
illegitimate animus against an unpopular group.6
More significantly, same-sex couples began to seek the right to
marry. They won a preliminary victory in Hawaii, where the state
supreme court held that a ban on same-sex marriage was subject to
strict scrutiny.7 Although the Hawaii case was short-circuited by the
adoption of a constitutional amendment allowing the state to limit
marriage to opposite-sex couples,8 the prospect that other states and
the federal government might have to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in Hawaii prompted Congress to enact the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996.9 Some courts, relying on state
constitutional provisions, did strike down bans on same-sex
marriages.10 One of those decisions came from California,11 where the
voters responded by passing Proposition 8 to amend the state
constitution to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples.12
Litigation challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8 and of
DOMA reached the Supreme Court last term. In Hollingsworth v.
Perry,13 the Court held that the proponents of the California
amendment lacked standing to appeal a lower court ruling that struck
down the Golden State’s ban on same-sex marriage after state officials
declined to do so.14 In United States v. Windsor,15 the Court held that
section 3 of DOMA,16 which defines marriage for federal purposes as
open only to opposite-sex couples, was unconstitutional. Both of these
6.

Id. at 632–35.

7.

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993).

8.

Haw. Const. art. I, § 23 (ratified 1998).

9.

Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)). More than 30 states also adopted measures
to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. E.g., Alaska Const. art. I,
§ 25; Ariz. Const. art. XXX, § 1; Mich. Const. art. I, § 25; Miss.
Const. art. 14, § 263A; Mo. Const. art. I, § 33; Nev. Const. art. I,
§ 21; Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11; Or. Const. art. XV, § 5a; S.C.
Const. art. XVII, § 15; Tex. Const. art. I, § 32; Utah Const. art. I,
§ 29; Wis. Const. art. 13, § 13.

10.

E.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Dep’t of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).

11.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).

12.

Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 (approved 2008).

13.

133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).

14.

Id. at 2668.

15.

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

16.

1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).

824

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Introduction

decisions were 5–4 rulings, although the votes did not fall along the
same lines: the majority in Windsor, the DOMA case, consisted of the
four more liberal justices joined by Justice Kennedy, who wrote the
opinion, while the four more conservative justices dissented;17 the
majority in Hollingsworth v. Perry consisted of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Scalia, from the conservative wing, and Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan from the more liberal side, while the conservative
Justices Alito and Thomas as well as the liberal Justice Sotomayor
joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent.
The divisions within the Supreme Court and the intensity of the
public debate about same-sex marriage led the editors of the Case
Western Reserve Law Review to organize a symposium in October
2013 to discuss the Court’s decisions and their implications. This issue
contains papers presented at that symposium. Participants included a
wide range of legal scholars, social scientists, and other commentators.
Several broad themes pervaded the program: doctrinal matters such
as the implications of these rulings for federalism and equal
protection, the role of the judiciary in addressing contentious public
questions, the nature of the family, and the place of empirical and
other social-scientific perspectives in legal decision making.
The papers might profitably be read in groups of two or three,
although many of the themes identified above appear at many points
in this issue. The first set of papers illuminates some institutional
factors raised by the marriage cases. Robert Nagel focuses on Justice
Kennedy’s approach to federalism in Windsor.18 Professor Nagel
suggests that the lead opinion’s discussion of federalism does not
really respect the role of the states despite rhetorical flourishes to the
contrary.
Next, Nancy Scherer brings the perspective of political science to
the analysis of the Windsor decision.19 She applies two models of
judicial decision making, neither of which seeks to parse constitutional
text, judicial precedent, or other traditional sources of legal
interpretation. Instead, she applies the attitudinal model, which seeks
to predict the votes of Supreme Court justices by focusing on each
member’s judicial ideology. Then she refines her analysis by means of
the strategic model, which refines the attitudinal model by
recognizing that justices at least occasionally vote with an eye toward
their colleagues’ preferences—this might represent a more formal way
of analyzing the so-called “long game,” or at least an intermediateterm perspective. Professor Scherer applies her approach not only to
17.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681; Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2658.

18.

Robert F. Nagel, Same-Sex Marriage, Federalism,
Supremacy, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1119 (2014).

19.

Nancy Scherer, Viewing the Supreme Court’s Marriage Cases Through
the Lens of Political Science, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1131 (2014).
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Windsor and Perry, the marriage cases, but also to Craig v. Boren,20
the case that established intermediate scrutiny as the standard of
review in cases involving gender-based classifications.
In the last paper in the first group, Susan J. Becker addresses the
role of the judiciary and explains why court rulings that uphold a
right to same-sex marriage reflect an appropriate use of judicial
independence rather than a usurpation of power that properly belongs
to the political branches or to the people as a whole.21
The next three papers address the nature of the family and its
implications for judicial decision making. Maggie Gallagher and
William C. Duncan criticize the Windsor opinion’s equal protection
analysis, which emphasizes the absence of a legitimate governmental
interest underlying DOMA.22 Instead, these authors urge that differing
views about families are sincerely held and do not reflect illegitimate
animus.
Next, Frances Goldscheider, a prominent demographer, applies
the tools of her field to analyzing same-sex relationships.23 In
particular, she examines long-term trends in household composition
and warns against inferring overly broad generalizations about the
nature of families from romanticized images of the past and
misleading portraits of stable, two-parent households in which
husbands and fathers went off to work to support the family while
wives and mothers stayed home to raise the children and take care of
domestic chores.
Helen M. Alvaré closes the second set of papers by examining the
role of children in the development of family law.24 In particular,
Professor Alvaré contends that constitutionalizing a right to same-sex
marriage changes the law’s focus from imposing and enforcing duties
on adults toward children toward granting rights to adults that might
only indirectly benefit children.
The third set of papers directly addresses equal protection in the
marriage context. Andrew Koppelman contends that Windsor, despite
20.

429 U.S. 190 (1976).

21.

Susan J. Becker, The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence in the
Continuing Quest for LGBT Equality, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 863
(2014).

22.

Maggie Gallagher & William C. Duncan, The Kennedy Doctrine: Moral
Disagreement and the “Bare Desire to Harm,” 64 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 949 (2014).

23.

Frances Goldscheider, Rescuing the Family from the Homophobes and
Antifeminists: Analyzing the Recently Developed and Already Eroding
“Traditional” Notions of Family and Gender, 64 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 1029 (2014).

24.

Helen M. Alvaré, Same-Sex Marriage and the “Reconceiving” of
Children, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 829 (2014).
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the absence of discussion of the standard of review, can be understood
as part of the Supreme Court’s larger body of equality jurisprudence.25
He explains that the Windsor Court did not treat DOMA as a statute
that classified on the basis of sexual orientation but rather as one that
drew a line based on sex: the statute classified on the basis of the sex
of the parties to the marriage. Professor Koppelman goes on to defend
the Court’s silence on the standard of review by situating Windsor in
the context of other cases that did not rely on an explicit level of
scrutiny but instead invalidated laws or policies that rested on no
more than a bare desire to harm. Then he argues for an expansive
definition of “bare desire to harm” that includes extreme indifference
toward the interests of a group that is singled out for extraordinarily
harsh treatment.
By contrast, Sherif Girgis criticizes Windsor for having arbitrarily
defined marriage under the Constitution when the document was
silent on the subject.26 Girgis finds that Justice Alito’s dissenting
opinion was the most persuasive of all the approaches taken in the
case. He contends that the federalism challenge to DOMA was
misguided, rejects the argument that the federal statute improperly
classified on the basis of either sexual orientation or sex, and that the
majority’s approach was no more defensible than that taken in
Lochner v. New York.27
The third paper in this group serves as a bridge between the
discussions of equality and federalism. Nancy C. Marcus explains why
the brief discussion of state power in Windsor should not be
understood as supporting federalism-based objections to bans on
same-sex marriage.28 While conceding that Edith Windsor had not
asserted a federalism claim, Professor Marcus analyzes why Justice
Kennedy’s federalism discussion ultimately makes the ruling one
about equal liberty rather than state autonomy.
The last two papers from the symposium involve state authority.
First, Ernest A. Young maintains that Windsor can and should be
understood as a federalism ruling but that the decision so understood
does not necessarily give the states carte blanche to define marriage:
any state definition of marriage still must satisfy the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause, an issue that was irrelevant to the
25.

Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare
Desire to Harm,” 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1045 (2014).

26.

Sherif Girgis, Windsor: Lochnerizing on Marriage?, 64 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 971 (2014).

27.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

28.

Nancy C. Marcus, When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song
in Disguise: How Windsor’s State Powers Analysis Sets the Stage for the
Demise of Federalism-Based Marriage Discrimination, 64 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 1073 (2014).
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resolution of the dispute over DOMA’s validity.29 Professor Young
goes on to make a broader point, that the Constitution does not give
the federal government express or implied authority to define
marriage.
Second, Robin Fretwell Wilson examines the tension between
recognizing both a right to same-sex marriage and space for
religiously motivated opponents of such a right.30 She notes that the
political process sought to accommodate both sets of interests in those
jurisdictions where same-sex marriage was adopted by legislation or
ballot initiative but that recognizing same-sex marriage through the
judicial process might make accommodation more complicated. But
while recognizing that approval of same-sex marriage by legislation or
initiative might be less likely in those states that have not already
taken this path, she urges that the political process nevertheless holds
greater promise of reconciling the competing interests than does
litigation.
The final paper in this issue was not actually presented at the
symposium but reflects much of the program’s content. Ronald Kahn,
a prominent political scientist who specializes in the Supreme Court
and constitutional theory, attended all of the conference presentations
and wrote a synthetic essay that might be understood as the
comprehensive work of a discussant.31 However, Professor Kahn seeks
to go beyond summarizing and synthesizing the various papers and
also tries to explain how and why a purportedly conservative Supreme
Court rendered decisions in both Windsor and Perry that advanced
gay rights without finally resolving whether the Constitution affords a
right to same-sex marriage. That question remains on the table, but
these rulings will play a prominent role in litigation and political
debate in the future.

29.

Ernest A. Young, Is There a Federal Definitions Power?, 64 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 1269 (2014).

30.

Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Liberty Protections, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1161 (2014).

31.

Ronald Kahn, Understanding United States v. Windsor and the
Symposium Contributions Using Unidirectional and Bidirectional
Models of Supreme Court Decision Making, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
1293 (2014).
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